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Abstract
This article discusses the important role of  historical, cultural, social, 
and attitudinal aspects in the study of  law, there has been a shift from 
instrumental law to constitutive law.  While instrumental law considers law 
beyond the social and cultural spheres, constitutive law integrally embraces 
law, politics, ideology, and action.  Legal consciousness is an important asset 
for marginalised people who are at high risk of  discriminative treatments 
in occupational and social life. Not only will they are legally aware of  their 
rights and obligations at works, they will have adequate knowledge of  where 
and how to name, blame, and claim in case mistreatment do occur. Legally 
profi cient will allow them build legal protection which is not adequately 
provided by the authorized bodies.
Keywords: Instrumental law, Constitutive law, Legal Protection, Legal 
consciousness.
Introduction
Nowadays, many countries in the world have established a complex system 
of  laws and institutions expected to protect the interest of  people, particularly the 
marginalised one in the employment sector. This model of  legal protection has 
broader signifi cance in legal theory, it also refl ects assumptions in dominant research 
paradigms in law and society, and even this model and its critique have been applied 
to other areas of  law.1 
From the legal protection model perspective, the law is authoritative and effective 
instrument that offers victims with a tool by which they can use to force perpetrators 
to comply with legal rules. This model adopts that those who have suffered injuries 
will recognize their harms and invoke the law through litigation. In brief, they assume 
that those in the protected class are able and convinced to bear these burdens.2 This 
1 Kristin Bumiller, "Victims in the Shadow of  the Law: A Critique of  the Model of  Legal 
Protection," Signs 12, no. 3 (1987): 422.
2 Ibid., 106.
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kind of  strategy is called as “litigious policies,”3  or Complaint-Driven Enforcement 
Model4 , where the enforcement relies on individuals bringing their rights of  action. 
However, strategies of  equal protection may inadequately deliver the burdens imposed 
on marginalised people because they accept the authoritative discourse of  law rather 
than inquiry the compatibility of  legal rules with their legal conception. 
The proponents of  legal consciousness argue that litigation is just one of  the 
many avenues that disputants have in their catalogue of  choices. Even though the 
judiciary is believed to monopolize the enforcement of  legal norms, it is not the 
only source of  normative messages in society. Courts are not even the institutions 
that handle the majority of  legal confl icts and neither occupy the center of  legal life. 
To the contrary, only a minimal fraction of  disputes that we can label as legal enter 
the judiciary and from that number is really diffi cult to know how many are actually 
resolved.5 Thirty years ago, Galanter et.al pointed out that very few cases of  dispute 
were resolved. This minimal resolution was even smaller than the number of  cases 
the court was supposed to deal with, the fraction of  which was much smaller than 
the actual cases of  dispute.6 
As a matter of  fact, it is now trite to recapitulate that the modern justice system 
through aggressive prosecution and legislation of  punitive laws against batterers, 
has failed to respond adequately to crime generally and to marginalised people in 
particular.7 Many research showed that strong legal protection makes a difference, 
but it also displayed that even in the United States of  America where legal protection 
is strong, some victims are not afforded their rights.8 
3 Thomas F Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 
2002), 4.
4 Human Rights Watch (Organization), Hidden in the Home: Abuse of  Domestic Workers with Special 
Visas in the United States (New York: Human Rights Watch (Organization), 2001), 32.
5 M. A. Gomez, "All in the Family: The Infl uence of  Social Networks on Dispute Processing 
(a Case Study of  a Developing Economy)," (Stanford University (UMI Number: 3253485) 
Retrieved August 20, 2009, from Dissertations and Theses database., 2007), 23.
6 Bliss Cartwright, Marc Galanter, and Robert Kidder, "Introduction: Litigation and Dispute 
Processing," Law & Society Review 9, no. 1 (1974). Marc Galanter, "Afterword: Explaining 
Litigation," Law & Society Review 9, no. 2 (1975). Marc Galanter, "Reading the Landscape of  
Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly 
Contentious and Litigious Society," UCLA Law Review 31, no. 4 (1983). Marc Galanter, "The 
Day after the Litigation Explosion," Maryland Law Review 46, no. 3 (1986). Marc Galanter, 
"Adjudication, Litigation and Related Phenomena," in Law and the Social Sciences, ed. L Lipson 
and S Wheeler(New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1987).
7 Randy E. Barnett and John III Hagel, Assessing the Criminal. Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal 
Process (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1977).
8 The Human Right Watch Report (2001) concluded that The United States has failed to protect 
migrant domestic workers’ rights and to guarantee that workers have an “effective remedy” if  
their rights are offended. As a matter of  fact,  the report indicated that there were only six out 
of  twenty-seven domestic workers attempted to fi le complaints against their employers. Though 
most of  the workers knew  that their employment conditions violated U.S. law they did not 
wish to or did not know how to fi le legal complaints against their employers see further Human 
Rights Watch (Organization)..
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 However, despite the widespread adoption of  legal protection, the 
implementation of  such protection and its impact on victims have not been widely 
studied. In other words, this kind of  research might be considered as the bottom-
up approach, which is commonly defi ned in sociology of  law literature as the study 
of  critical legal consciousness. This study will provide a brief  review of  two bodies 
of  research. First, the research reviews the changing perspective of  law and society 
research from an instrumental view of  law to the view of  law as an integral part of  
society. This more expansive view of  the role of  law in society has led to the legal 
consciousness. Next, it reviews some of  the innovative work of  legal consciousness 
scholarship.
Instrumental and Constitutive Perspectives
There has been a shift the law and society research from instrumental to constitutive 
perspective. The former treats law as a separated entity and thus autonomous from 
social life while the latter implies the existence of  different competing forces that 
contribute to shape social life and normative system. Constitutive perspective puts 
law in the interconnection to and embeddedness in different other fi elds to allow 
holistic consideration of  law-infl uencing cultural and social aspects.
Sarat and Kearns9 introduced these two different perspectives in this area of  
research, the instrumental and the constitutive. Although these two perspectives are 
in similar way in favoring law in studying society, they hold opposing views by which 
law affects society: whether by imposing external sanctions or by shaping internal 
meanings. Subsequently, they likely to fail to notice the variety of  ways in which 
society responds to law, occasionally by ignoring it, reconstructing it, or using it in 
unusual and unanticipated ways. 
These two perspectives, the instrumental and constitutive, represent two basic 
views of  the relationship between law and society. Instrumentalist scholarship, which 
sees law as different from, and acting on society, focuses on legal norms, legal rules, 
and legal actors. And this separation has been an attempt to make out the power 
of  law as a tool for creating or supporting social change. Instrumentalist tries to “... 
search for the conditions under which law is effective, that is, when legislation or 
judicial decisions can be counted on to guide behaviour or produce social changes in 
desired ways.”10 In short, the instrumentalism emphasizes sharp distinction between 
legal standards on the one hand, and non-legal human activities, on the other. It then 
hypothesizes the effectiveness of  the legal standard upon society. 
On the other view, the constitutive perspective assumes that social life is run 
through with law, or in other words, “law shapes society from the inside out, by 
providing the principal categories that make social life seem natural, normal, cohesive, 
and coherent.”11 
9 A. Sarat and T. R. Kearns, Law in Everyday Life (Michigan: University of  Michigan, 1995).
10 Ibid., 27.
11 Ibid., 22.
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Scheingold against the instrumentalism
However Scheingold12 argues against the idea of  instrumentalism which assume 
that legal standard with litigation and courts decisions can produce effective social 
change. He proposes that declaration of  rights from courts has been the focus of  
a great number of  law reformers. Effective declaration realizes these rights which 
lead to equivalently meaningful change. Put in different words, "the myth of  rights is 
directly related to litigation, rights, and remedies with social change."13 The underlying 
ideology is that "the American political order indeed takes similar patterns of  rights 
and obligations specifi ed in the Constitution."14
Scheingold proposes the legal paradigm which views human interaction 
largely about rules and rights dominates the ideology of  the myth of  rights and 
mischaracterizes the interplay of  legal, political and social forces. Surely these views 
have, at least until lately, dominated the literature on law and politics in the United 
States. As a matter of  fact, Scheingold rejects the myth of  rights and proposes the 
constitutive understanding of  law and legal mobilization as he moves from the myth 
of  rights into his discussion of  the political signifi cance of  the ideology of  rights. He 
puts forward the concept of  the politics of  rights: “The politics of  rights implies 
a much more comprehensive assessment which includes but transcends the simple 
straight-line projection from judicial decision to compliance.”15 
Scheingold is skeptical of  the emphasis on litigation as a tool for redistributing 
power. He notes the tendency of  law and politics to reinforce the status quo, embedded 
as they are in the existing power structures. Nevertheless, he asserts the ideology of  
rights can play a signifi cant role in mobilizing action. “The myth of  rights provides 
political ideals [which] infl uence the behaviour of  government and private citizens. 
The politics of  rights is, in short, concerned with the interplay between ideology and 
action in American politics.”16
It is the recognition of  the relationship between law, politics, ideology and 
action that characterizes the constitutive view of  law and society. Sarat and Kearns 
highlight that constitutive perspective of  law decline the instrumentalist picture of  
law as outside to social practices. They attempt to draw the way legal power and legal 
forms exist in social relations. Constitutive perspective claim that instrumentalism 
brings about a falsifi ed impression of  the role of  law in everyday life. By centering on 
law as a distinct tool, or efforts of  law to change behaviour, instrumentalists diverts 
attention from the deep, often invisible, but pervasive effects of  legal concepts on 
social practices.17
12 Stuart A Scheingold, The Politics of  Rights (Michigan: University of  Michigan Press, 2007).
13 Ibid., 5.
14 Ibid., 17.
15 Ibid., 8.
16 Ibid., 83.
17 Austin Sarat, "The Law Is All Over: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of  the 
Welfare Poor," Yale Journal of  Law and the Humanities 2 (1990): 50.
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Bumiller refuses legal protection model
Bumiller18 shows the seeming failure of  anti-discrimination doctrine. She 
contradicts the instrumental concept of  law and in the contrary examines the individual 
attitudes and behaviour which can serve to oppose the apparent goal of  civil rights 
legislation and litigation. She states that the traditional model of  legal protection, 
which supposes law to be a powerful tool to end discriminatory practices, is fl awed 
because it fails to take into account the way individual actions and attitudes are 
infl uenced by law. Bumiller takes a fi rm stand that the view the primacy of  the legal 
order produces the illusion that law is a source of  power and authority disconnected 
from other power structures in society. In fact, the deep logic of  the law does not 
refl ect the complex social reality of  discrimination in society, but rather restricts legal 
resolution to social problems appropriate for litigation.19
Bumiller argues that the 1964 Act and subsequent legislation generally have 
failed to rectify earlier forms of  injustice, discrimination, and inequality. She notes that 
the conventional wisdom generally attributes these failures to inadequate resources, 
entrenched cultural biases, and the slow progress in attaining real economic and 
social gains. To the contrary, Bumiller says that the model of  legal protection that 
forms the basis for civil rights law itself  discourages social victims from emancipating 
themselves from oppressive conditions. She further argues that protective legislation 
may serve to perpetuate patterns of  behaviour (among both victims and victimizers) 
that maintain discriminatory practices. Modern law is said to embody and reproduce 
a socially constructed, dehumanized victim. Bumiller further proposes that there is 
a current proliferation of  antidiscrimination strategies. This proliferation is seen as 
a coherent extension of  the universalization of  rights, which is itself  a result of  the 
civil rights model of  legal protection. She concludes that "by including all groups, it 
further dilutes the benefi ts received by the historically most disadvantaged groups." 20
Bumiller refuses the traditional model of  legal protection but relies on stories 
told by victims of  discrimination to explore the complications of  anti-discrimination 
law. In order to better understand the relationship between law and social change, she 
creates a paradigm for legal consciousness research by opposing the perspectives 
and experiences of  individuals against the traditional, instrumentalist view of  legal 
protection. Bumiller’s position on the role of  law deduces from Foucault’s explanation 
of  law and social control. She notes that Foucault’s conception of  law and ideology 
moves us away from the conventional view of  anti discrimination law as a command 
directed at its perpetrators to acknowledgement of  the law as a form of  knowledge 
and power that shapes its subjects. This brings up the inquiry of  how law practices 
its authority on victims and creates victims views of  themselves and their position.21
The essential claim of  the constitutive approach to the study of  law is the 
assertion that, “Law exercises its power by less obvious means than can be discerned 
18 Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of  Victims (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1988).
19 Ibid., 10.
20 Ibid., 117.
21 Ibid., 33.
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from formal and visible decision making in court.”22 Bumiller detects evidence of  
the mutual nature of  law as constitutive of  social relations and the importance of  
examining the gap between legal doctrine and law in everyday’s life. She affi rms 
the power of  legal ideas and concepts to infl uence social relationships even in the 
absence of  a legal claim. She points out that the introduction of  legal themes may 
shape behaviour at all stages of  the confl ict - from its creation to its settlement. The 
situation is metamorphosed by the introduction of  law even if  the parties do not talk 
to lawyers or take the case to a legal forum.23
The theoretical change from the instrumental view of  law to the constitutive 
view of  law leads scholarship toward a acknowledgement of  the importance of  
analysing the ways that law comes out of  and is constituted by specifi c historical, 
cultural, social situations and attitudes. 
The change in the understanding of  the meaning of  law needs a signifi cant 
change in the way of  the study the relationship between law and society, from a focus 
on institutions to individuals. Consequently, Bumiller maintains the importance of  
interviewing individual subjects about their thoughts and experiences with law. “An 
important premise of  this book, therefore, is that neither the potentialities nor the 
troubles deriving from social confl ict can be fully understood outside the changes of  
an individual life.” 24 Constitutive studies of  law have extended to the understanding 
that law is more than a set of  rules and procedures, law constitutes a belief  system 
which is imbedded in, and perpetuates, a certain power structure. It is the study of  
law as a set of  beliefs, and the signifi cances of  those beliefs that forms the basis of  
legal consciousness research. 
Discourse of  legal consciousness
Legal consciousness has been an important topic in socio-legal research because 
it represents the intersection of  law as an institutional force and individuals as legal 
agents. Traditionally, the sociology of  law has been related with the legitimacy of  
law, which fi nally is rooted in individuals' belief  in and adoption of  legal order.25 
However, this traditional conceptualization of  legal consciousness which emphasizes 
on the acceptance of  offi cial power by individuals has moved away into the notions 
of  justice and rights that people convey in their minds and practice in their every-day 
life. Hence, scholars have begun to investigate whether and why people invoke the 
law in disputes26 or in social movements aimed at broader social change.27 
22 Ibid., 37.
23 Ibid., 36.
24 Ibid., 35.
25 Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of  Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 
1985).
26 Sally Engle Merry, “Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes,” Annual Review of  
Anthropology 21, no. (1992).
27 Michael McCann, Rights at Work (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1994).
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Merry28 defi nes consciousness as “people’s conception of  the “natural” and 
normal method of  work acccomplishment, habitual patterns of  talk and action, and 
commonsense in understanding of  the world.” Further she asserts that consciousness 
is not only the realm of  "deliberate, intentional action but also that of  habitual action 
and practice.”29 In line to Merry, Ewick & Silbey defi ne consciousness as the part 
of  a reciprocal process through the patterned, stabilized, and objectifi ed meanings 
given by individuals to their world. The already institutionalized meaning becomes 
part of  the material and discursive systems to limit and constrain the making of  new 
meanings in future time.30 Nielsen puts that their commonsense understanding of  
the way law works. 31 In other words, legal consciousness refers to the way people 
think about the law. This includes the prevailing norms, day-by-day practices, and 
commonly adopted   ways of  legal problem solving. Put differently, this results from 
legally- and ideologically-related experiences.32
In relation to consciousness, Max Weber introduced “the subjective meaning-
complex of  action”33 which can be implemented to the intersection of  social 
agency and legal consciousness. Opposed to Marx, Weber proposes that culture can 
infl uence agency while agency can infl uence culture. Weber describes the subjective 
interpretation of  action as an effect to understand human behaviour in terms of  “the 
concepts of  collective entities.”34 This suggests that for Weber a dual character of  
action/consciousness in which thoughts or concepts “have a meaning in the minds 
of  individual persons, partly as of  something actually existing, partly as something 
with normative authority.”35
Consciousness is subjective, the product of  an interaction between the observer 
and the observed.36 Jean Comaroff  defi nes consciousness as "inherent in the daily-life 
practical constitution and is  integrated in the process in which external social and 
cultural factors have constituted the subject."37 Consciousness may appear in subtle 
and different ways of  how people act and speak and what their utterance contain.38 
This becomes an integrated part of  practical knowledge to which people refer when 
28 Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans, 
Language and Legal Discourse (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1990).
29 Ibid., 5.
30 Patricia  Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of  Law: Stories from Everyday Life, Language 
and Legal Discourse (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1998), 39.
31 Laura Beth Nielsen, License to Harass: Law, Hierarchy, and Offensive Public Speech (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004).
32 Ibid., 7.
33 Max Weber, The Theory of  Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1947), 102.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 101-102.
36 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans, 4.
37 J. Comaroff, Body of  Power: Spirit of  Resistance: Culture and History of  a South African People (Chicago: 
Univ. Chicago Press, 1985), 5.
38 J. Comaroff  and J. L. Comaroff, Of  Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness 
in South Africa, vol. 1 (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1991).
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doing things. The construct of  consciousness is much more dynamic than a mere social 
entity. This "type of  social practice”39 assigns meanings to social structures, which 
is not an end. The assigned meaning will undergo further refi nement, reproduction, 
and development along individual experience that occurs within the social structures 
by which one’s live is defi ned. Of  equal importance, it changes with contradictory 
experiences. People question what they are doing and shift directions if  it appears 
that their way of  acting either is not working or contradicts what happens to them.40
Time has played an important role in the process of  individual's consciousness 
changes. One’s consciousness is likely to change along with their experience in social 
process. Such this change in consciousness constitutes a great interaction of  social 
and structural entities. Comprehension about how consciousness changes will help 
a systematic discussion of  legal consciousness. Nielsen asserts that consciousness, is 
simultaneously created and communicated; it is contingent, meaning that it changes 
based on the knowledge and experiences of  individuals, as well as context.41
Legal consciousness refers to “how people understand and use the law” and 
"participate in legality construction process." 42 Recently many legal consciousness 
studies have merely emphasized on law conceptualization and its impacts on the 
individuals’ daily lives.43 They reveal the dynamic nature of  legal consciousness concept. 
It is not the external enforcement that counts in legal consciousness establishment, 
but rather, it is internally learned process through which individuals gain their legal 
consciousness. They are in active engagement to form their individual specifi c legal 
consciousness. First, social consciousness becomes the foundation of  individual legal 
consciousness. Second, with legal experiences and reactions they develop their legal 
consciousness. The dynamic nature of  legal consciousness construct and its socially 
related process are manifested in words or actions, a multifaceted, contradictory, and 
variable legal consciousness."44 
Establishment of  legal consciousness does not stand alone. Different aspects 
play a role in the establishment of  legal consciousness. They are, among others, the 
perceptions of  lawmaking bodies, the court system, law enforcement and other 
“meanings, sources of  authority, and cultural practices commonly recognized as 
legal.”45 As it is common in other schemas, legality is not exclusively inherent in 
individual's ideas and attitudes. To be always vital, individuals and groups have to 
39 Ewick and Silbey, 225.
40 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans, 5.
41 Laura Beth Nielsen, "License to Harass: Offensive Public Speech, Legal Consciousness, and 
Hierarchies of  Race, Gender and Class," (University of  California, Berkeley (UMI Number: 
9931344) Retrieved August 21, 2009, from Dissertations and Theses database, 1999), 39.
42 Ewick and Silbey, 35; Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class 
Americans.
43 Erik W. Larson, "Institutionalizing Legal Consciousness: Regulation and the Embedding of  
Market Participants in the Securities Industry in Ghana and Fiji " Law & Society Review 38, no. 
4 (2004).
44 Susan S. Silbey, "Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of  Law," Law & Social Inquiry 17, no. 1 
(1992): 46.
45 Ewick and Silbey, 22.
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continually produce, work, invoke, and deploy it."46 As suggested by some legal 
consciousness studies, legal ideas may be pushed and pulled, which implies the texture 
of  law in our everyday existence in order to construct legality.47
Law may be pulled to construct and restrict what people may act and decide. The 
restriction is elaborated into the elaborated regulations, conduct-prohibition codes, 
and social norms. They are all designed to reserve the already arranged power and 
order. Through their familiarity these codes, lay people will be used to adopting t and 
obeying the formal regulations. Such this acceptance by the people has opened a way 
for the law to shape the everyday life of  the people and rule some courses of  action 
without which they would have been taken otherwise.  In this way, law has created 
natural, normal, cohesive, and coherent society based on the principal categories."48 
At the same time, law may be pushed by individuals' own readings of  law." This 
kind of  process has enriched the variants of  legality. In this perspective, law indeed 
dynamically develops. Through legality context in daily life, ordinary people contribute 
to shape and assign meaning to an "abstract but binding form."49 The legality enacted 
everyday in turn, will result in the establishment of  a theory for legal, institutional, 
and social changes. Any decision that may have impacts on the law will result in new 
meaning and a new legal claim. Therefore,  while it restricts what action individuals 
may have taken, opportunities of  redefi nition  of  and challenge against the  restraints 
are wide open.50  With legality, individuals may also anticipate on the vast resources 
of  the state by mobilizing the law. The accumulated of  individual’s needs for legal 
system is likely to result in great effects on other people through the creation of  new 
legal rights and novel legal claims.51 Thus, in spite of  the fact that law has colonized 
everyday existence through oppression and inequality, legality provides a means of  
resistance.52 Legal consciousness studies have revealed that the law provides schemas 
and frames to construct the meaning of  what people have experienced.53 Using the 
existing  legal concepts and resources, people assign meaning to their disputes with 
their neighbors, their family problems, even their experiences with street harassment.54 
46 Ibid., 43.
47 Anna Maria Marshall and S. Barclay, "In Their Own Words: How Ordinary People Construct 
the Legal World," Law & Social Inquiry 28, no. 3 (2003a): 617.
48 Sarat and Kearns, Law in Everyday Life, 22.
49 Marshall and Barclay.
50 Ewick and Silbey.
51 Frances Zemans, “Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of  the Law in the Political System," 
APSR 77, no. (1983).
52 Michael McCann and Tracey  March, "Law and Everyday Forms of  Resistance: A Socio-Political 
Assessment," Studies in Law Politics and Society 15, no. (1995); Sally Engle Merry, "Culture, Power, 
and the Discourse of  Law," New York Law School Law Review 37, no. (1995a); Sally Engle Merry, 
“Resistance and the Cultural Power of  Law " Law & Society Review 29, no. 1 (1995b); Sarat and 
Kearns, Law in Everyday Life.
53 Patricia  Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account 
of  Legal Consciousness. , Vol. 26/731," New England Law Review 26, no. (1992); Merry, Getting 
Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans.
54 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans; Laura 
Beth Nielsen, "Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of  Ordinary Citizens 
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Studies of  legal consciousness deals with "how, where, and with what effect law is 
produced in and through commonplace social interactions within neighborhoods, 
workplaces, families, schools, community organizations and the like."55
Concluding Remark
Considering the important role of  historical, cultural, social, and attitudinal 
aspects in the study of  law, there has been a shift from instrumental law to constitutive 
law.  While instrumental law considers law beyond the social and cultural spheres, 
constitutive law integrally embraces law, politics, ideology, and action.  
Legal consciousness is an important asset for marginalised people who are at 
high risk of  discriminative treatments in occupational and social life. Not only will 
they are legally aware of  their rights and obligations at works, they will have adequate 
knowledge of  where and how to name, blame, and claim in case mistreatment do 
occur. Legally profi cient will allow them build legal protection which is not adequately 
provided by the authorized bodies. 
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